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CONTROLLING RESIDENTIAL STAKES
Lee Anne Fennell* and Julie Roin**
Communities suffer when residents lack sufficient monetary stakes in their homes.
This point has been underscored by recent rashes of foreclosures and abandonments,1 and
it also underlies longstanding concerns about the relative impacts on neighborhoods of
renters and owner-occupants.2 However, residents who have too large a financial stake in
their homes also create grave difficulties for local governance, as exemplified by the
NIMBYism of William Fischel's undiversified, risk-averse “homevoters.”3
“Understaked” households fear losing their homes, whether through foreclosure or
gentrification, while “overstaked” households fear losing their primary source of
financial security—the value stored in their homes.4 These risks generate personal
disutility, create conflicts between tenants and homeowners, set neighboring communities
against each other, and hobble local improvement efforts at every scale.
Local jurisdictions, ground zero for the fallout from residential “mis-staking,” should
have an intense interest in helping their residents reach more desirable intermediate
stakeholding positions. A community filled with properly staked residents will be less
*

Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. We thank participants in the
University of Chicago’s conference on Reassessing the State and Local Government Toolkit and in the
2009 Property Works in Progress conference for helpful comments and questions on this project. Prisca
Kim and Eric Singer provided excellent research assistance.
1
We use the term “abandonment” here in its colloquial sense, to refer to an owner’s decision to cease all
payments and upkeep associated with a property and to vacate the premises. The common law does not
permit owners to abandon real property in the legal sense of unilaterally terminating ownership. See, e.g.,
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
2
See infra notes 31-32, and accompanying text.
3
Fischel posits that homeowners vote in ways that will protect and enhance the value of their largest
assets—their homes. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 9-12 (2001). Risk aversion plays
an important role in Fischel’s account, making homeowners into “NIMBYs” even when a proposed change
carries a positive expected value. See id.; see also BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 384 (2005)
(giving an example illustrating Fischel’s point and concluding that homeowners’ “stake in the
community—the community as it now stands—is too big.”). “NIMBY” is an acronym for “not in my back
yard.” See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra, at 9.
4
The home is the single largest financial asset for most U.S. homeowners. See FISCHEL, supra note 3, at
4; Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:
Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., 2006, at A1, A22–23,
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf. Because the home is a highly
undiversified investment, homeowners tend to be risk averse with respect to changes that might affect its
value. See FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 9-12; O’FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 384.
**
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vulnerable to problems of displacement and exclusion because the incentives of renters
and homeowners, and of insiders and outsiders, will be more closely aligned. Such “rightstaking” would also avoid spillover-generating cycles of foreclosure and abandonment.
Yet although local governments may want to control the size and shape of future
residential stakes, existing stakeholders currently control local government policy.5 This
essay addresses how, under these circumstances, state and local governments might
identify and move toward a more productive and cooperative equilibrium.
Many commentators have seized on the ongoing housing meltdown as an apt
occasion for rethinking and reworking residential arrangements that have ceased to work
well for many households.6 But relatively little attention has been paid to the potential
role that can be played by state and local governments in this process.7 We seek to fill
that gap here by examining how and why governmental entities at the state and local
levels might regulate or shape the financial stakes that residents have in their homes.
It is worth noting that many jurisdictions already influence stakeholding through
measures that regulate the landlord-tenant relationship8 or that encourage owneroccupancy;9 more direct efforts to regulate mortgage arrangements or to encourage longterm tenancies are not difficult to imagine.10 More promising stake-shaping alternatives,
we suggest, would build on innovative financial tools for rearranging housing market
risks.11 Drawing lessons from numerous implemented and proposed approaches, local
governments could offer programs that help homeowners offload some of their home’s
upside appreciation potential and downside property value risk to investors.12 Similarly,
local governments could make a financial instrument keyed to local property values
5

See FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 14-16, 92-96. Cf. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1871 & n.74 (1994) (noting the “selfperpetuating quality” of exclusionary zoning and other efforts at “community self-definition”).
6
Some have questioned governmental promotion of homeownership while others have urged innovation
in homeownership. Compare, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 INDIANA L.J. 189 (2009); with Andrew Caplin et al.,
Facilitating Shared Appreciation Mortgages to Prevent Housing Crashes and Affordability Crises, The
Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2008-12 (September 2008), ‘http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/09_mortgages_caplin.aspx.
7
In a paper currently under development, two scholars plan to address the extension of the Community
Land Trust template to additional households through programs subsidized by local governments. Benito
Arruñada and Amnon Lehavi, Prime Mortgage Institutions for a Subprime Era (abstract dated February
2009 on file with authors). For past work on this topic, see sources cited in Part II, infra.
8
See infra Part III.A
9
See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
10
See infra Part II.A (discussing and critiquing these possibilities and noting potential legal
impediments).
11
See infra Parts II.B and III.B.
12
Many approaches to reconfiguring homeownership risk have been proposed. See, e.g., ANDREW
CAPLIN AT AL., HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A CROSSROADS (1997);
ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST
ECONOMIC RISKS (1993); see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047
(2008). (discussing literature on these and numerous other homeownership-risk-reallocation approaches,
and proposing a new tenure form).
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available to tenants.13 More radically, local governments, assisted by state law, could
formulate shared equity arrangements in which residents hold stakes in the housing
markets of surrounding localities, as well as in their own local community.14
Our goal in discussing these ideas is not to advocate any particular approach, but
rather to draw attention to stake-shaping as an important and underexplored state and
local policy lever. We do contend, however, that residential risk-shifting mechanisms
have some important advantages over more traditional approaches that implicitly address
residential stakes.
The essay proceeds in four parts. Part I explains why stakeholding presents a problem
for local governance. Part II considers how local governments might alter the stakes of
homeowners. Here, we suggest that voluntary risk-offloading programs are likely to
dominate efforts to mandate or regulate homeownership stakes. Part III turns to tenant
stakeholding. We argue that offering tenants subsidized stakes in the local housing
market through financial options is likely to be more promising than the suite of
alternatives—lease regulation, rent subsidies, and rent control—that is typically proposed
to address problems of tenant displacement and disengagement. Part IV introduces the
idea of regionalized stake-sharing to address interlocal spillovers. We maintain that this
sort of synthetic regionalization carries advantages over other proposed approaches, such
as resort to regional government, extraterritorial voting schemes, and interlocal
bargaining platforms.15
I. COSTLY MIS-STAKES
Because residential life is interdependent, communities want members to have a stake
in the common enterprise. Stakeholding has often been implicitly managed at the local
level through rough proxies like zoning for single-family homes. Changes in lending
practices16 and ownership patterns17 have put pressure on that model, however. At the
same time, local governments (both individually and collectively) have had to grapple
13

See Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement while
Protecting Low-Income Families, The Urban Institute, Opportunity and Ownership Project, No. 8 (May
2007), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/311457.html; see also O’FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at
369; Part III. B, infra.
14
See infra. Part IV.B.
15
See infra Part IV.A.
16
See, e.g., EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA’S LATEST BOOM AND BUST 13-19
(2007) (chronicling changes in mortgage practices from the post-war period onward, including the recent
expansion of the subprime lending sector); Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 27, 30-33, 36-40, 43-44 (2009) (describing the use of “piggyback loans” (second mortgages)
that reduce or eliminate any down payment requirement, low- and no-documentation mortgages,
adjustable-rate mortgages with “teasers,” and loans with low, zero, or negative amortization of principal).
17
In 2007, about 7% of owner-occupied units were “manufactured homes” or trailers while another 6%
consisted of condominiums or cooperatives. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Housing Survey for
the United States: 2007, Table 3-1, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ah07/tab31.pdf. By contrast, in 1980, a mere 3.7% of owner-occupied units consisted of “manufactured homes” and
1.75% were condominiums or cooperative apartments.
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with the twin distributive concerns of displacement and exclusion. The clashing goals of
current and potential residents who are, variously, understaked and overstaked have
proven highly problematic for local communities.
A. Understaking
Plummeting housing prices have made communities vulnerable to defaults by
understaked homeowners. According to recent estimates, about 20% of U.S. homeowners
are currently “underwater” on their mortgages, meaning that they owe more than the
home is worth,18 and foreclosure rates continue to rise.19 Many households’ downside
exposure is greatly limited by their lack of any significant financial stake in their homes.
While this is especially true in nonrecourse states, few households have significant assets
aside from their homes, making recovery of deficiency judgments against them difficult
in other states as well.20 Understaked homeowners, then, can be viewed as holding an
option to default.21 Despite media coverage of the “jingle mail” phenomenon—
homeowners walking away from houses that lost value after mailing the keys to their
lenders22—relatively few underwater homeowners have opted for voluntary default.23 But
18

See Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, House-Price Drops Leave More Underwater, WALL ST. J., May
6, 2009, at A3 (reporting that Zillow.com and Moody’s Economy.com place the percentage of underwater
U.S. homeowners at 21.9% and 19%, respectively, and discussing methodological issues that could cause
estimates to overstate the extent of the problem); Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University,
The
State
of
the
Nation’s
Housing
2009
19
(2009),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2009/son2009.pdf [hereinafter “2009 Housing”]
(reporting Zillow.com’s estimate that 48% of existing home sales in 2008 were effected “at a loss,” below
either the seller’s purchase price, outstanding mortgage balance, or both).
19
See Mortgage Banker’s Association, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Continue to Climb in Latest
MBA National Delinquency Survey, press release dated May 28, 2009, available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/Press Center/69031.htm (the first quarter of 2009 had a
seasonally adjusted delinquency rate of 9.12% and a foreclosure rate at 3.85%, the combined total the
highest rate of delinquency ever recorded in the history of the MBA delinquency survey); 2009 Housing,
supra note 18, at 19 (at the end of 2008, 3.3% of first-lien loans in foreclosure, 4.8% of housing loans at
least 60 days overdue).
20
See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 30 (2009).
21
See, e.g., Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 20, at 26-27 (discussing and comparing support for the
“distress model” and the “option model” of foreclosure decisions). Some recent research has suggested that
homeowners who put no money down when purchasing a home are disproportionately likely to default. See
Austin Kelly, “Skin in the Game”: Zero Downpayment Mortgage Default, 17(2) J. HOUS. RES. 75 (2008);
see also Stan Liebowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis: Zero Money Down, Not Subprime
Loans, Led to the Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009, A13 (reporting, based on analysis of
loan-level data, “that, by far, the most important factor related to foreclosures is the extent to which the
homeowner now has or ever had positive equity in a home”).
22
See, e.g., John Leland, Facing Default, Some Abandon Homes to Banks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 2008, at
A1; Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 20, at 29.
23
See Diana Olick, Treasury: Jingle Mail a Myth, CNBC, June 26, 2009, available at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/31570460 (cites Michael Barr, Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions as saying “we don’t see in the data borrowers who are walking away because they can or
because their homes are underwater. We do see borrowers who are unable to make the payment…”); see
also Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul Willen, Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory
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the ripple effects of waves of involuntary foreclosures continue to drive down prices and
drive up incentives to push losses onto lenders.24
Understaked homeowners generate significant costs for local communities. Recent
empirical work confirms the intuition that negative spillovers flow from clusters of
foreclosures.25 Untended homes and yards attract vandals, squatters, and even wildlife.26
From algae in pools to overgrown lawns, signs of decay telegraph the community’s
deterioration, invite expectations of further declines, and discourage buyers. In addition
to their effects on local property values, concentrated foreclosures are associated with
increased residential turnover and heightened criminal activity; they also contribute to
local fiscal difficulties and service shortfalls.27 These negative impacts have led
beleaguered cities to try everything from suing lenders28 to assessing fines against them.29
While the acute problems associated with understaked homeowners are much in the
national spotlight, a more chronic form of understaking also deserves attention. Most
tenants have little financial stake in their own housing units, a fact that generates three
concerns for communities.30 First is the worry that tenants will do less than homeowners
to keep up their homes and contribute to the community. A wide variety of social benefits

and Evidence, FRB of Boston Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 08-3, June 5, 2008, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153413 (study of 100,000 underwater Massachusetts homeowners in the 1990’s).
24
A recent study shows that while no one voluntarily defaults when the equity shortfall is less than 10%
of the value of their house, “[t]he percentage of households willing to default strategically increases to 5%
if the shortfall is between 10 and 20% of the value of the house and reaches 17% when the shortfall reaches
50%.” Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Defaults
on Mortgages, June 2009, at 4, available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/luigi.zingales/research/paper/moral_and_social_constraints_6-25-09.pdf.
25
See, e.g., Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been and Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated
Mortgage Foreclosures, NYU Center for Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 08-41 (2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270121; Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent W. Yao, Spillover Effects of
Foreclosure on Neighborhood Property Values, 38 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. AND ECON. 387 (2009). See also
Raphael W. Bostic & Kwan Ok Lee, Mortgages, Risk, and Homeownership among Low- and ModerateIncome Families, 98 AM. ECON. REV. (pap. & proc.) 310, 313-14 (2008) (discussing externalities from
foreclosures).
26
See Nick Miroff, Shuttered Homes, Thriving Wildlife, WASH. POST May 27, 2008, at B-1.
27
For a recent overview of the literature on the community impacts of foreclosures, see G. Thomas
Kingsley, et. al., The Impacts of Foreclosures on Families and Communities 13-21 (May 2009), available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf.
28
A number of cities have filed lawsuits against lenders. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Baltimore is
Suing Bank Over Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008; Shawn A. Turner & Jay Miller, Ready for
a Fight: With defendants hunkering down, city is prepared for a long battle, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND
BUSINESS, Jan. 28, 2008, at 1 (Cleveland); Donna Leinwand, Bill Conde, Cities suing lenders in strategy
against foreclosures; Various legal claims—from federal civil rights laws to city codes—used in efforts to
stem loss of tax base and decline of property values, USA TODAY, May 16, 2008, at 15A (Minneapolis,
Cleveland, Baltimore and Buffalo); U.S. Lenders are sued for fraud; Credit Crunch, THE EVENING
STANDARD July 24, 2008, at 32 (San Diego).
29
See, e.g., Nicholas Casey, Banker: “What Did I Do Wrong, Officer? Cop: “You’ve Got Algae in the
Pool, Sir, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2009.
30
Although our focus here is on community spillovers stemming from tenant understaking, tenant
households also bear understaking costs, including the possibility of displacement.
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have been associated with owner-occupancy,31 although causation is difficult to untangle
from selection effects when assessing the significance of tenure form.32 A second concern
is that tenants, fearing displacement as a result of rising rents,33 will oppose initiatives
likely to benefit the community.34 Not only may tenants be unable to gain from
neighborhood improvements, but any resulting displacement would cause them to lose
whatever intangible surplus they have built up in their homes. The evidence regarding
actual tenant displacement due to gentrification is mixed and hotly contested.35
Nonetheless, the destabilizing effects of any turnover that does result from community
change, as well as the stresses associated with tenant strategies like “doubling up” with
other families,36 comprise a third set of potential understaking spillovers.
B. Overstaking
Although the problem of homeowner overstaking has been upstaged by an
31

A large literature has examined the social benefits associated with homeownership See, e.g., Denise
DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J.
URB. ECON. 354 (1999); Donald R. Haurin et al., The Impact of Neighborhood Homeownership Rates: A
Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 13 J. HOUSING RES. 119 (2003); See Robert D. Dietz &
Donald R. Haurin, The Social and Micro-Level Consequences of Homeownership, 54 J. URB. ECON. 401
(2003).
32
See, e.g., William G. Gale et al., Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX
NOTES 1171, 1177 (June 18, 2007); Haurin et al., supra note 31, at 132–33.
33
Although rising rents present tenant households with the most obvious understaking-related
displacement threat, tenants can also be displaced when housing units are withdrawn from the rental
marketplace. Eminent domain is another potential source of displacement, but it presents issues that are
distinct from those we address here, in part because its use does not depend on tenure form or a resident’s
financial stake. It is, however, possible that some of the mechanisms we discuss below could affect the
frequency or impact of localities’ resort to condemnation. See text accompanying notes 108-110, infra.
Tenants can also be displaced when the property they are occupying is foreclosed upon. See Mary
Shanklin, Renters Become Victims to Home Foreclosures, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 7, 2009, at H-11.
Tenants are thus perversely exposed to downside market risk, even as their lack of a financial stake in the
property keeps them from realizing any upside gains.
34
See, e.g., Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, at 1; Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification
and Displacement, New York City in the 1990’s, 70 J. Am. Planning Assoc. 39, 39-40 (2004) (describing
political effects of gentrification fears).
35
For two different takes on the empirical evidence regarding the displacement effects of gentrification,
compare J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 413-15 (2003) with john a.
powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old "One-Two": Gentrification and the K.O. of
Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 465-76 (2003). Recent work on this question
includes, for example, Freeman & Braconi, supra note 34, at 45 (2004) (finding that poor households living
in gentrifying neighborhoods in New York City in the 1990s were less likely to move than similar
households living in non-gentrifying New York City neighborhoods); LANCE FREEMAN, THERE GOES THE
‘HOOD 127 (2006) (“the process of neighborhood change in gentrifying neighborhoods is often gradual,
driven more by succession or a change in who moves into the neighborhood than rapid and widespread
displacement”); Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and
Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URBAN STUD. 23 (2006) (suggesting that factors such as
rent regulation, the selection effects of prior gentrification, and low-income households doubling up or
entering shelters limited the extent of observed displacement through gentrification in New York City in
the 1990s, and concluding that displacement fears are not unfounded).
36
See Newman & Wyly, supra note 35, at 49.
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unprecedented glut of understaked homeowners, it remains significant. Most
homeowners continue to hold a substantial equity stake in their homes; although the
value of the home has shrunk, so too have the other assets of homeowners, such as the
balance in their retirement plans and, often, even the marketability of their own human
capital.37 If anything, the current economic crisis has left homeowners more vulnerable to
changes that might (further) affect the value of their homes.
The problems of NIMBYism and exclusionary zoning have been recounted at length
elsewhere, so a brief mention here will suffice. As Fischel has explained, the political
behavior of homeowners is largely driven by their desire to maximize the value of their
homes.38 In some ways, this impulse is functional; if what is good for the community is
good for the home’s value, then homeowners will vote in a way that makes the
community better off.39 A catch, however, is that often one’s immediate neighborhood or
jurisdiction can be made better off by making other neighborhoods or jurisdictions worse
off. If we add a hefty dose of risk aversion, we find homeowners not only all too willing
to push locally undesirable land uses elsewhere, but also unwilling to experiment with
unproven land uses—or, indeed, to entertain many kinds of change at all.40 Their
reluctance has real bite because, at least outside of central cities, homeowners tend to
control the local political process.41
Local and state governments have an obvious interest in addressing the problems of
overstaking and understaking. In the balance of the essay, we identify and critique some
directions that such action might take.
II. HOMEOWNER STAKES
A. Mandating and Regulating Stakes
Whether as a direct response to current conditions or to forestall future crises, local
governments might undertake coercive efforts to shore up residential stakes. The idea of
regulating residential stakeholding is not new. For example, common interest
communities often ban or restrict leasing (or sub-leasing).42 Similarly, local governments
37

Since the recession began in December 2007, the unemployment rate has jumped 4.6%, reaching 9.5%
in June 2009. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation: June 2009, Jul. 2, 2009, at 1,
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
38
FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 75.
39
See, e.g., id. at 268.
40
See, e.g., id. at 8-10,269.
41
See, e.g., id. at 80-81; see also William A. Fischel, Political Structure and Exclusionary Zoning: Are
Small Suburbs the Big Problem? in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND LAND POLICIES, Gregory K. Ingram &
Yu-Hung Hong, eds. (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2008) (examining the effects of jurisdiction size and
the degree of metropolitan fragmentation on local political decisions about land use).
42
See David E. Grassmick, Minding the Neighbor’s Business: Just How Far Can Condominium Owners
Go In Deciding Who Can Move Into the Building?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 185,194 (noting trend towards
leasing restrictions in condominium agreements); Katharine N. Rosenberry, Home Businesses, Llamas and
Aluminum Siding: Trends in Covenant Enforcement, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 443, 461-465 (1998);
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often extend more favorable property tax treatment to owner occupants than to absentee
landlords or vacation home owners.43 More broadly, de facto regulation of stakeholding
has long occurred under the banner of zoning for single-family residences. If zoning for
single-family homes or granting tax-preferred treatment to owner-occupants no longer
guarantees high-stakes residents, local governments might seek to regulate stakeholding
more directly, such as by forbidding loan to value ratios above a certain level, requiring
PMI, or outlawing certain kinds of high-risk products. Small-scale regulation of
mortgages is not entirely unprecedented, although some past attempts along these lines
have foundered.44 Local regulation of mortgages premised on a “spillover control”
rationale might be viewed quite favorably in the current economic climate. However,
local governments would still face significant legal impediments and normative
objections to any policy that mandates an equity stake or regulates the residents’
financing arrangements.
Because local governments have only the powers delegated to them by state
legislators and their state constitutions, new programs always raise questions about the
scope of those delegated powers. Even jurisdictions accorded “home rule” do not have
unlimited freedom, especially when policies run afoul of long established limits on local
power. Though mandating single-family residences, often a rough proxy for high-staked
residents, clearly falls within local jurisdictions’ zoning power, mandating actual high
staking, in the form of minimum value to loan ratios or mandatory PMI, may not. After
all, mortgage restrictions would not relate to the use of the land per se, as zoning

Zachary M. Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Common Interest Developments: Rejecting
Reasonableness in Favor of Consent 2 (2007) available at http://works.bepress.com/zach_rawlings/3/.
Governmental entities have had less success in their efforts to restrict renting through their zoning codes.
See Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 543, 577-581 (2006) (describing litigation over rental restrictions, which suggests courts are
hostile to categorical requirements that a main dwelling be owner-occupied, although more willing to
permit restrictions on the rental of accessory dwelling units).
43
Many jurisdictions provide tax relief for “homestead” property, defined as property that serves as the
owners’ primary residence. This relief may be substantial. See, e.g., FLA. CONST., art. VII, § 4(c) (imposing
3% cap on annual assessment increases on homestead property); MICH. COMP. LAWS 380.1211(1) (2009)
(exempting homestead property from school district property tax). See Richard S. Franklin & Roi E.
Baugher III, Protecting and Preserving the Save Our Homes Cap, 77 FLA. BAR J. 34, 40 (2003).
44
Roy v. Ducote, 399 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 1981) involved a challenge to a subdivision restriction that
prohibited homes financed through certain governmental programs. The defendants stated that they wished
to “form a neighborhood that does not look like a ‘government program’ and to create a quiet, peaceful
neighborhood with attractive surroundings and minimal amounts of noise and extraneous intrusions.” Id. at
741. The restriction was struck down on federal and state constitutional grounds. Id. More recently, Illinois
experimented with implementing mortgage counseling requirements at the ZIP code level in an effort to
address subprime lending—a short-lived approach that has since been replaced by consumer protection
legislation that applies at the county-wide and state-wide level. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Can Mandated
Financial Counseling Improve Mortgage Decision-Making? Evidence from a Natural Experiment (Feb
2009) Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2008-03-019, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285603, at 4-8; Press Release, Governor Blagojevich signs anti-predatory
lending law, announces buyer outreach initiative to help fight foreclosures, November 2, 2007, available at
http://www.ihda.org/admin/Upload/Files//5f95c2fa-5427-423d-9361-1cc77ba7e831.pdf.
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generally does.45 Further, many states prohibit local governments from enacting laws
regulating private or civil law relationships, except as incident to another municipal
power.46 Although it is unclear exactly how far those prohibitions extend,47 outlawing the
use of certain financing schemes within the jurisdiction may be construed as regulating a
civil law relationship. Because the prohibitions exempt municipal laws that are “incident
to an exercise of an independent municipal power,” however, state enabling legislation
granting localities the specific power to regulate mortgages would appear sufficient to
overcome this obstacle.48
Another potential hurdle stems from federal law. Some mortgages are originated by
national banks, and state or local regulation relating to such banks raises preemption
questions. The measures we have described would protect homeowners and their
neighbors rather than bank investors; although this would not necessarily immunize them
from preemption, the state has a recognized role in protecting consumers.49 Localities
45

See, e.g., CHR General, Inc. v. City of Newton, 439 N.E.2d 788, 791 (Mass. 1982) (finding ordinance
regulating condominium conversions not authorized by the town’s zoning power because “’a fundamental
principle of zoning (is that) it deals basically with the use, without regard to the ownership, of the property
involved or who may be the operator of the use.’”) (quoting 1 A. RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING §
1.04, at 1-21 (4th ed. 1982)).
46
See Gary Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 671,
690 (1973). Both of the broadly influential model home rule provisions, one promulgated by the American
Municipal Association and the other by the National Municipal League, explicitly provided that home rule
powers would not “include the power to enact private or civil law governing civil relationships except as an
incident to an exercise of an independent municipal power.” See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of
Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 675 (1964) (citing
language from section 6 of the American Municipal Associations Model Constitutional Provisions for
Home Rule). Judicial enforcement of this exception, however, preceded the appearance of the models. See
Sandalow, supra, at 674-85; see also MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
673-74 (1916) (citing the “common understanding” that “such general subjects as crime, domestic
relations, wills and administration, mortgages, trusts, contracts, real and personal property, insurance,
banking, corporations, and many others” are matters of state rather than local control).
47
See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 702 (“case law tells little either way about the supposed private law
exception.”) For example, one could say that an ordinance preventing the rental of a unit without running
water as a residence “interferes” with potential contracts or civil relationships, but it is clear that localities
do exactly that when writing and enforcing their building codes. Such regulation, however, can be
characterized as falling within the private or civil law exception’s own exception of being “incident to an
exercise of an independent municipal power”—here, the jurisdiction’s zoning or building code authority.
See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 46, at 675-78. Of course, the bounds of these independent municipal
powers are themselves open to question. See CHR General, cited in note 45, supra (finding condominium
conversion regulation was not incident to the municipality’s exercise of its zoning power, and thus was
invalid under the civil relationships exception contained the Home Rule Amendment of the Massachusetts
Constitution).
48
See supra notes 46-47.
49
The Supreme Court recently held in Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., LLC, 557 U.S. __ (2009) , slip
op. at 7, that ordinary enforcement of a state fair lending law was not preempted by the National Bank Act.
Although the issue involved in that case was somewhat different than those that our hypothetical regulation
would present, the Court’s rejection of a sweeping agency interpretation and its recognition of a role for
state law is suggestive. It also may be significant that federal law expressly exempts state usury laws from
preemption. See 12 U. S. C. §85. Further, in reaching its holding in Cuomo, the Court notes that even the
Comptroller of the Currency agrees that “the case law does recognize …that ‘states retain some power to
regulate national banks in areas such as contracts, debt collection, acquisition and transfer of property,
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might also emphasize that the regulated parties would be mortgagors, not financial
institutions: banks may continue to write whatever mortgages they want to write,
although local purchasers may not avail themselves of those products.50 However, by
eliminating part of the potential market, localities would arguably be placing a regulatory
burden on federally chartered banks, which might at least trigger preemption analysis.51
Even if these legal barriers could be surmounted, there remain serious normative
objections to this line of regulation. Because the ability to obtain mortgages of various
types will vary based on wealth, local governmental mortgage regulation could turn into
yet another tool for exclusionary zoning.52 Nor is it clear that such regulation would
effectively lower affected purchasers’ overall debt burden. Since money is fungible,
purchasers might substitute other forms of debt for home mortgage debt. They might, for
example, keep higher balances on their credit cards, (after using all their available cash to
make the required house downpayment). Or they might borrow to purchase a car rather
than pay outright.53 These other debts may make it impossible for them to service their
mortgage debts (or keep up their property) in times of financial hardship. Additional
regulation of the mortgage relationship might do no more than serve an information
function, telling purchasers that the larger community thinks they are behaving in a risky
manner and should think twice before taking on so much debt. That may or may not
make purchasers pause and change their behavior.
Moreover, while approaches of this sort would address the problem of understaked
homeowners, they would exacerbate the problem of overstaked homeowners. These
overstaked homeowners, in turn, have interests that often run directly counter to those of
another traditionally understaked group—tenants. This raises the question of whether a

zoning, criminal, and tort law.’” Slip op. at 10 (quoting Comptroller’s statement of basis and purpose,
contained at 69 Fed. Reg. 1896 (2004) (internal citations omitted)). Maximum loan to value regulation and
mandatory PMI requirements could be characterized as falling within these areas of residual state power.
50
The Court’s opinion in Cuomo expressly distinguishes between oversight of “corporate affairs” and
“the power to enforce the law,” 557 U.S. at __, slip op. at 4. Cf. McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347
(1896) (state law voiding certain conveyances of real property by insolvent persons was not preempted).
51
See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. at13 (“Beyond genuine dispute, state law may not
significantly burden a national bank’s own exercise of its real estate lending power, just as it may not
curtail or hinder a national bank’s efficient exercise of any other power, incidental or enumerated under the
NBA.”). To forestall preemption concerns, states sometimes exempt banks from regulatory regimes.
Although preemption claims would cover only national banks, state “bank parity laws” may require that
exemptions applicable to national banks be extended to cover state-chartered banks. See, e.g., Public Law
094-0280, 765/ILCS 77/70(a) (HB 4050; exempting from coverage mortgage originators exempt from
coverage under the Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987, a category including both nationally
chartered and state banks under 205 ILCS 635/1-4(d)(1)(ii)); Public Law 095-0691, 765 ILCS 77/70(a)
(SB1167; same). Obviously, such exemptions would dilute the force of the measure and distort borrower
decisions.
52
It is even possible that constitutional challenges might be raised about the power to enact such
regulations, if they were viewed as a mere pretext for wealth discrimination. Cf. Roy v. Ducote, discussed
supra note 44.
53
To the extent that people are already at the limit of their capacity to incur nonhousing debt, however,
equity requirements would have an effect.
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more transformative approach to local stakeholding might do a better job at addressing
the issues presented by these different constituencies.54
B. Facilitating Stake-Shifting
One antidote to NIMBY-generating overstaking is to reduce the degree to which the
fortunes of individual homeowners turn on fluctuations in area home values.55 The idea
of home equity insurance has been around for decades.56 The most well-known local
implementation of the concept is Oak Park, Illinois’s equity assurance program, adopted
in the 1970’s in an effort to forestall “white flight”; the plan covered only highly
localized price changes that were uncorrelated with larger metropolitan trends.57 A
number of policies along similar lines have since been adopted in other localities.58 A
recent pilot program in Syracuse, New York extended downside market protection to a
broader spectrum of housing market risks by keying payouts to a ZIP-code based home
price index.59 Such programs have not attracted widespread participation,60 but they may
have had a positive impact in reassuring residents.61 In addition to programs that address
downside market risk, a wide spectrum of affordable housing programs have featured
“limited equity” or “shared equity” arrangements that leave some percentage of the
home’s upside appreciation potential with the local government or with a community
group.62 Private variations on these programs, including shared-equity mortgages, attempt
54

Given our focus on state and local initiatives and our interest in identifying politically plausible
alternatives, we do not discuss another issue relevant to residential stakeholding in the United States—the
federal income tax advantages granted to homeowners.
55
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects,
41 URB. STUD. 317, 335-36 (2004); Adam Yarmolinsky, Reassuring the Small Homeowner, 22 PUBLIC
INTEREST 106, 106 (Winter 1971).
56
See, e.g., Matityahu Marcus & Michael K. Taussig, A Proposal for Government Insurance of Home
Values Against Locational Risks, 46 LAND ECON. 404 (1970); Yarmolinsky, supra note 55.
57
See, e.g., Maureen A. McNamara, The Legacy and Efficacy of Homeowner’s Equity Assurance: A
Study of Oak Park, Illinois, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1468-69 (1984). A variety of other conditions and
limitations applied. For example, the plan covered only 80% of qualifying losses, and also excluded from
coverage declines in value attributable to damage to the property in question. See id.
58
See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Radical Financial Innovation, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND
THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES 306, 316 (Eytan Sheshinski, ed., 2007);
Liz Hersch, Profile of Existing Home Equity Assurance Programs, Fall 2001, available at
www.pauljsentner.com/no_wehav/referenc.all/homeqcha.rts/heqchts_.doc
59
Andrew Caplin et al., Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper
No. 03-12, May 3, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=410141.
60
Sarah
Max,
Selling
L.A.,
Buying
Chicago,
CNNMONEY.COM,
Aug.
9,
2004,http://money.cnn.com/2004/08/06/real_estate/investment_prop/hedging/index.htm
(“Since
the
[Syracuse] program was launched in August 2002, . . . only 76 homeowners have signed up, according to
its director[,] Virginia Smith.”); Hersch, supra note 58 (showing relatively low participation rates for ten
surveyed programs, although a few programs in Chicago have attracted hundreds or thousands of
households and at least two of them appear to be growing).
61
See, e.g., Caplin et al., supra note 59, at 28 (suggesting that even where participation in a home equity
insurance program is low, there might be positive effects for the community such as increased confidence).
Paid claims have been low to nonexistent in such programs. See, e.g., Hersh, supra note 58.
62
See, e.g., JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, NAT’L HOUS. INST., SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE
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to deliver a form of equity financing to homeowners instead of requiring them to rely
exclusively on debt.63
These two approaches (offloading downside risk, and selling off upside potential)
could be combined in a single product or policy package.64 A simple example will
convey how such a program for reducing homeownership risk would work. Suppose
Holly Homebuyer wishes to purchase a home in Maroon Meadows that costs $200,000.
Ivan Investor makes the following two-part deal with her: First, he will give her a lump
sum now, and when Holly sells, she will pay him an amount that represents the portion of
her home’s appreciation (if any) attributable to housing market changes (that is, screening
out appreciation attributable to changes made on-site to the home and grounds).65 Second,
he will collect a lump-sum premium from her now, and when she sells, he will pay her
the portion of the home’s loss in value (if any) attributable to housing market changes
(again, screening out losses caused by changes to the property itself). When all is said
and done, Holly gets some money upfront66 and Ivan bears most of the home’s upside
and downside risk.67 If the home later sells for $250,000 due to a general rise in home
values in the area, Ivan collects $50,000 of the proceeds. If the home later sells for

CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RESALE-RESTRICTED, OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 65 (2006); J. Peter Byrne &
Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 541–51 (2007); Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for
Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85 (2002); Rick Jacobus and Jeffrey
Lubell, Preservation of Affordable Homeownership: A Continuum of Strategies, Center for Housing
Policy, Policy Brief (2007), available at
http://www.ncbcapitalimpact.org/uploadedFiles/downloads/JacobusLubelloption4-07.pdf.
63
See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Shared-Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability, and
Homeownership,18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 209, 217 (2007); Andrew Caplin et al., A Report
Commissioned by the Menzies Research Center for the Prime Minister’s Home Ownership Task Force, Vol.
1: Innovative Approaches to Reducing the Cost of Homeownership (2003) at 7-8, available at
http://www.mrcltd.org.au/research/home-ownership/volume_1.pdf.
64
One of us has elsewhere suggested that the offloading of upside and downside risk associated with
offsite factors could be combined in a new default tenure form. Fennell, supra note 12.
65
There are a variety of ways to accomplish this disaggregation, including the use of housing price
indexes. See, e.g., id., at 1073-78 and sources cited therein; Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home
Equity Insurance, 19 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. AND ECON. 21, 25-26 (1999).
66
We assume here that the proceeds from alienating upside potential would be larger than the premium
required to insure against downside loss.
67
When effectuated with respect to marketable stocks, securities, or commodities, this arrangement is
denominated a “collar.” Typically businesses and investors enter into collars to lower the cost of hedging
against unfavorable price movements, as collars have a lower cash price than one way options. The cash
discount comes from the sale of the rights to the gains generated by favorable price movements. See Jeffrey
L. Rubinger, Tax Planning Strategies With Equity Derivatives, 76 FLA. BAR J. 45, 45 (2002). However,
most collar arrangements cover stated—and relatively short-- time periods, rather than being open-ended.
That is, prices, gains and losses are determined and paid at the end of six months or a year, rather than (as
envisioned in this essay) waiting until the sale of the underlying property. Settling options based on sales
rather than at specific temporal intervals introduces complications in pricing that have received some
attention in the literature. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, supra note 65, at 41-43; Caplin et
al., supra note 63, at 218-19.
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$150,000 due to a general decline in home values in the area, Ivan pays Holly $50,000 to
cover her loss.68
Because it is hard to imagine ordinary homebuyers making deals with investors in
this fashion, an intermediary institution would be necessary to bring about the changes
just described.69 That institution would arrange the cash transfers incident to the risk
shift, and seamlessly (from Holly’s perspective) move the upside and downside risk
associated with the home to Ivan and his ilk. While private entities could (and to some
extent have)70 taken on this risk-shifting role, local governments might be especially
well-positioned—and well-motivated—to spearhead a move to a new homeownership
paradigm. With the increasing availability of financial instruments tied to local housing
prices, local governments would not have to engineer the risk shifts from scratch, but
rather could serve as a user-friendly conduit for matching homeowners with investors.
Program options could range from mere information provision71 to policies that
encourage or even require the use of risk-shifting tools.72
Increased use of markets in housing risk would help protect against both understaking
and overstaking. Selling off upside appreciation potential makes homes more affordable
and, other things being equal, reduces the need for mortgage debt and hence the

68

In this simple example, we ignore the effects of interest and inflation, and also make the simplifying
assumption that Holly would alienate 100% of the upside and downside risk associated with “offsite”
factors. Many homeowners would wish to retain at least some portion of the upside, and, for affordability
reasons, would likely keep part of the downside as well.
69
See, e.g., Shiller & Weiss, supra note 65, at 33–34 (discussing the potential for insurance companies to
offer “pass-through futures and options”); See Juerg Syz, Paolo Vanini & Marco Salvi, Property
Derivatives and Index-Linked Mortgages, 36 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 23 (2008) (proposing that
index-based risk shifting be built into mortgages).
70
A number of private enterprises have offered products for rearranging homeownership risk. Recent
examples include REX & Co., http://www.rexagreement.com (product offers funds in exchange for a share
of home equity); Equity Finance Mortgage, http://www.efm.info/ (shared equity mortgage product offered
by Rismark International through Australia’s Adelaide Bank); Advanced e-Financial Technologies, Inc.,
SwapRent, http://www.swaprent.com/ (product would let homeowners toggle to and from an “economic
renting” mode that offloads upside and downside home price risk). See also supra notes 56-63 and
accompanying text (describing several models for shifting homeownership risk through public or private
mechanisms).
71
At the very least, local governments could inform residents of the existence of products for hedging
homeownership risk. Many are undoubtedly unaware, for example, that futures and options based on local
housing indexes exist. Financial instruments keyed to home prices in a number of cities, developed by
Robert Shiller and Karl E. Case, became tradable on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (now CME Group)
in the spring of 2006. See e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Derivatives Markets for Home Prices (NBER Working
Paper No. 13,962, April 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13962.pdf (discussing history
and future prospects of these derivative markets).
72
Encouragement might take the form of subsidies, tax preferences, or regulation. While mandating a
particular level of risk shifting seems implausible and even unwise, local governments could require a
reduced-risk version of homeownership to be the default option for residents, so that purchasers would
have to affirmatively opt into the traditional level of homeownership risk. See Fennell, supra note 12; cf.
Michael S. Barr et al., An Opt-Out Home Mortgage System, The Hamilton Project, Working Paper No.
2008-14 (2008) available at www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/09_mortgage_system_barr.aspx (presenting
a proposal that would require lenders to offer borrowers a certain set of standard terms as a default matter).
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likelihood of default.73 Buffering downside housing market risk reduces the mortgage
default risk and increases liquidity in housing markets. Homeowners protected against
market downturns will be better able to sell or refinance in a down market, both because
the payment they will receive from the program will enable them to meet their existing
mortgage obligation, and because potential buyers will not be frightened away from
purchasing by the prospect of losing money.74 The homeowner’s reduced stake in both
upside and downside price changes would also be expected to dampen the impulse
toward risk-averse NIMBY-like behavior.75 There are, of course, numerous design
choices that would be required in setting up such a program.76 While space does not
permit us to address them here, a large literature examines the inner workings of such
risk-shifts, and the many past and existing entrepreneurial efforts along these lines offer
useful case studies.
Voluntary municipal programs offering homeowners risk-shifting options would
confront fewer legal obstacles than the direct regulation of mortgages; at most, state
enabling legislation would be required.77 Such legislation could either authorize specific
programs78 or grant local governments broader authority by explicitly including within
“general welfare” and “home rule” powers the right to develop risk-shifting mechanisms

73

Some homebuyers may instead opt for more expensive homes, retaining traditional levels of debt, just
as they may undermine the goals of mortgage regulation by increasing their levels of nonmortgage debt.
See text accompanying note 53. Tightening credit standards may limit access to debt financing, however.
See Caplin et al., supra note 6, at 5..
74
As it is, falling prices may discourage rather than encourage sales—as Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff
put it, buyers do not want to “catch a falling knife.” Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Price-Protect Your Home,
FORBES, Sept. 16, 2002, at 10. Further, getting bank approval for “short sales” is a difficult and lengthy
process, chasing away buyers. With option money in hand, a seller should be able to afford to pay off the
mortgage in full even if the sales price is less than the amount of the outstanding mortgage.
75
See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Fennell, supra note 12, at 1100-03.
76
Technical issues include the appropriate construction and use of indexes, the treatment of inflation, the
timing for exercising an option, the structure and timing of payments and payouts, and other details
affecting price. See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 12, at 96-98, 116-200; Shiller & Weiss, supra note 65.
Regulatory oversight would need to address, among other issues, concerns about investor “capture” of local
governance, consumer mistakes and confusion, and discrimination in the pricing or availability of riskshifting mechanisms. See, e.g., Fennell supra note 12, at 1095-98, 1104-07, 1115-17. The new program’s
interface with existing regulatory structures, including those governing lending, securities, and insurance,
as well as with federal, state, and local taxation mechanisms, would also require attention. See, e.g., Caplin
et al., supra note 59, at 24-28; Andrew Caplin et al., Rectifying the Tax Treatment of Shared Appreciation
Mortgages, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267064; Fennell supra note 12, at 110709.
77
The underlying financial instruments would be subject to federal regulation, however, and it is possible
that changes in the legal treatment of derivatives could affect the availability or structuring of those
instruments.
78
The State of Illinois, for example, specifically authorized cities with populations of more than 1
million to create homeowner equity assurance programs of the type pioneered by Oak Park. See The Illinois
Home Equity Insurance Act, §65 ILCS 95/1 et seq. (2009). For a short description of the politics underlying
this enactment, see Caplin, et al., supra note 59, at 5-6.
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aimed at improving housing security. Given the nascent state of knowledge, the latter
approach would carry distinct advantages.79
Beyond mere enabling, state governments could help by providing administrative
support for these innovative programs. Although local governments may work together
and share information in the normal course of events, a state agency or commission
charged with oversight of housing programs may provide resources or simply
coordination. Resulting exchanges of information and ideas could hasten the
development of valuable programs and perhaps avoid perpetuating some of the errors
which will undoubtedly arise in the course of what will be a trial and error experimental
process. Moreover, some localities may be too small to create these types of markets and
market devices; a state coordinating entity could provide a platform for joint ventures.
The development of such programs raises normative as well as legal concerns. One
primary worry relates directly to stakeholding itself—will homeowners who have
offloaded risk care too little about their communities? Two factors would be expected to
constrain this effect. First, homeowners will still live in the community,80 and thus will
continue to have a direct consumption interest in the community’s fortunes.81 Second, the
offloaded risk is that associated with area housing price trends; homeowners will still
enjoy (or suffer) the results of any maintenance, renovation, or decorating choices that
they make. If homeowners primarily contribute to the community through behaviors like
maintaining their homes and forming robust ties to others in the community, reductions in
home value risk would not be expected to have a significantly negative behavioral effect.
When the salutary effects of reducing exclusionary homeowner behavior are taken into
account, net gains appear likely.
Another concern is that reconfiguring homeownership would work all too well—for
homeowners. Even if homeownership is made more affordable through risk-shifting,
many households will choose to rent for at least some portion of the life cycle. When
communities flourish and property values rise, concerns emerge about gentrification and

79

See Caplin, supra, note 59, at 7-8 (detailing shortfalls in programs enacted pursuant to Illinois’
statutory scheme).
80
Although the program may make it easier for residents to leave a declining area, the disruption and
costs of moving would remain a significant disincentive to doing so. Perhaps more important, the risks of
staying are greatly reduced; one need not fear additional property value decreases, or worry about selling
before others do. See, e.g., Yarmolinsky, supra note 55, at 109; Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of
Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157, 174
(Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972). Homeowners also should be reluctant to leave improving areas, since the
benefits of that improvement are not portable.
81
While that same consumption interest might also drive NIMBY-like behaviors (rendering them less
responsive to risk reduction), it is possible that the latter are driven primarily by risk aversion about home
values rather than a belief that the changes in question actually reduce quality of life. See, e.g., FISCHEL,
supra note 3, at 9-11. Significantly, with the risk of property value declines out of the picture, homeowners
would have to justify their objections in terms of the housing consumption experience rather than rely on
the assertion that the change would harm property values. See, e.g., Yarmolinsky, supra note 55, at 106;
Fennell, supra note 12, at 1101.
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tenant displacement.82 Addressing these concerns requires reconfiguring the stakes of
tenants as well as homeowners.
III. TENANT STAKES
Perhaps the most important drawback of leasing rather than owning is that tenants
lack the option to remain in their homes for as long as they wish.83 There are many ways
to deliver this option to tenants, including familiar devices like rent control, rent
subsidies, and longer leases. We will discuss these traditional responses briefly before
turning to a more innovative approach to reconfiguring tenant stakes.
A. The Usual Suspects
Rent control is typically proffered as the solution to concerns about tenant
displacement. The pros and cons of rent control have received considerable scholarly
attention which we will not attempt to summarize here. Instead, we wish to focus on two
features of rent control that make it less than ideal for addressing the problem of
understaked tenants. First, rent control concentrates the costs of avoiding tenant
displacement on landlords and their current and future tenants, leaving open only the
question of how costs will be distributed among and between those groups.84 Controls
that suppress rents below market levels deliver benefits to current tenants, but the
associated costs are absorbed within the rental housing market. Either landlords chisel on
maintenance and services to the detriment of their current tenants,85 or their profits
82

Interestingly, rising property values could present difficulties not only for tenants, but also for
homeowners who have alienated their upside appreciation rights under the scheme discussed above—
without rights to the increasing equity, rising property taxes would become problematic. See Fennell, supra
note 12, at 1107-09 (discussing this problem and some possible approaches to it). Politically, such
difficulties may lead to support for “welcome stranger” property tax assessment rules or other tax caps. See
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (describing “welcome stranger” assessment).
83
For discussions of the significance of security of tenure, see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential
Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359–63,368–70 (1986); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to
Remain: Common Law Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86
N.C. L. REV. 817, 820-29 (2008); Richard Arnott, Tenancy Rent Control, 10 SWEDISH ECON. POL’Y REV.
89, 111-12 (2003).
84
See, e.g., WILLIAM TUCKER, ZONING, RENT CONTROL AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 37 (1991)
(describing effects of rent control as “war between tenants and landlords”); ANTHONY DOWNS, A
REEVALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS 3 (1996) (“Much evidence indicates that all rent
controls, even temperate ones, transfer income from owners to tenants or between various classes of
tenants.”).
85
For empirical work on this question, see, for example, Choon-Geol Moon & Janet G. Stotsky, The
Effect of Rent Control on Housing Quality Change: A Longitudinal Analysis, 101 J. POLIT. ECON. 1114
(1993) (studying how housing quality in New York City varied over time depending on the magnitude of
the implicit subsidy delivered to tenants through rent control). While Moon and Stotsky found that units
with proportionately larger rent control subsidies were less likely to experience quality improvements, their
evidence on quality declines was mixed. See id. at 1139; see also DOWNS, supra note 84, at 12, 55-58
(noting that although empirical studies suggest that “stringent” rent controls lead to more deterioration in
housing units, the evidence is mixed on whether “temperate” controls have that effect). The picture is
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decline. Reduced landlord profits can translate into a diminished stock of rental
housing,86 making it more difficult for newcomers to find accommodations.87 Second,
rent control tends to lock existing tenants into particular units.88 While it might seem that
keeping people in the community is the point of rent control,89 an option to remain is
different than a distortive pressure to remain, which can, among other things, reduce the
responsiveness of labor supply90 and keep tenants in larger or smaller units than desirable
given their current family configurations.91
Rent subsidies funded by local taxation would avoid the cost-concentration of rent

complicated by the fact that tenants receiving large subsidies under rent control tend to stay in their units
for a long time, and hence have greater incentives to engage in maintenance on their own. See Moon &
Stotsky, supra, at 1125, 1139.
86
See, e.g., Lerman and McKernan, supra note 13, at 1. As Anthony Downs explains, controls that keep
rents below market levels suppress price signals that would otherwise induce entry when demand increases;
to the extent profits are diminished below “normal” returns, controls send an erroneous signal that induces
exit. See DOWNS, supra note 84, at 21-26; 45-48; see also id. at 48-52 (discussing empirical findings
suggesting that “stringent” rent controls reduce supply, but noting that studies of “temperate” controls had
not evidenced a supply effect). Rent control is viewed as a major reason for the decline in private rental
markets in Europe. See GAVIN MCCRONE AND MARK STEPHENS, HOUSING POLICY IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE
20-21 (1995); E. JAY HOWENSTINE, ATTACKING HOUSING COSTS: FOREIGN POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 75
(1983); see also DOWNS, supra note 84, at 48 (“The experience of the United Kingdom strikingly confirms
that stringent rent controls reduce new construction of rental units in the long run.”). Where rent control
ordinances have avoided supply problems, it may be because their price caps are so relaxed as to have had
little binding effect. See MARGERY A. TURNER, HOUSING MARKET IMPACTS OF RENT CONTROL: THE
WASHINGTON, D.C. EXPERIENCE 95-96 (1990) (“evidence suggests that rent control in the District of
Columbia has had little or no supply effect,” noting that “the rent control regime is a moderate one that
explicitly seeks to maintain the profitability of investment in rental housing”); id. at 97 (“It is possible that
the reason rent control has had no impact on supply is that its impact on price has been negligible....” but
finding that rent control in D.C. suppressed rents by an average of $50 per month ); JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM
& RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 134 (1988) (review of studies suggests that
“neither moderate nor strong [as distinguished from restrictive] forms of control have caused a decline in
either the quality or supply of the rental stock”); id. at 220 (“both the positive and negative economic
effects of moderate rent control (its most widespread form) … [are] limited”).
87
The prevalence of long-time tenants in controlled units is consistent with rent control’s effect on
newcomers. See TUCKER, supra note 86, at 48 (“Most rent-controlled apartments [in NYC] are occupied by
people who have been in continuous residence since 1971—and some have been occupied by the same
people (or their friends or relatives) since 1943.”). Another concern is that shortages of rental housing will
lead landlords to screen based on improper criteria. See DOWNS, supra note 84, at 61.
88
This result follows most clearly if stricter limits on rent increases apply within a given tenancy than
between tenancies, as with “vacancy decontrol.” See Arnott, supra note 83, at 95-96; DOWNS, supra note
84, at 58. But any controls that produce scarcity in rental housing will contribute to lock-in; no tenant wants
to give up her place if she will have difficulty finding another. See DOWNS, supra note 84, at 59-60.
89
See Radin, supra note 83, at 368-71 (discussing a communitarian justification for rent control). Rent
control might solve a collective action problem in keeping a community that is highly valued by all of its
members from unraveling as a result of households’ individual actions to move to cheaper markets. See id.
at 369. A fully portable tenant benefit, even one that enables households to stay if they wish, would lack
this advantage. See text accompanying notes 107-109, infra.
90
See Arnott, supra note 83, at 110-11. Related points have been made in the context of homeownership:
owners facing a difficult market tend to become stuck in place, potentially reducing their ability to take
advantage of job opportunities elsewhere. For discussion of this issue and how downside home equity
protection would help, see, e,g., Yarmolinsky, supra note 55, at 107; Fennell, supra note 12, at 1109-10.
91
See DOWNS, supra note 84, at 59-60,
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control but, depending on program design, may still have a lock-in effect. They are also
likely to be politically vulnerable, and any uncertainty about the program’s continuing
viability will erode tenants’ time horizons, and accordingly, the social benefit of such
programs.
Requiring landlords to offer prospective tenants longer lease terms might seem to
offer another solution. We might first ask why the market does not already produce
lengthy residential leases. One possible reason is that they tend to be asymmetrically
binding on the parties. A landlord could be compelled to comply with the lease for its
entire term, but the landlord would be unlikely to collect anything beyond the security
deposit from a low-income tenant who breaks a long lease. Pricing this one-way option
into the rental amount is certainly possible, but would run counter to the goal of housing
affordability.92 Forcing landlords to offer longer leases at the same price as shorter leases
would raise landlord costs and produce the same dynamics as rent control.
B. Giving Tenants Options
Robert Lerman and Signe-Mary McKernan have proposed another way to confer on
tenants the right to remain in place: financial options that are keyed to local rent levels.93
The basic outlines of an option-based approach can be illustrated with a simple
example.94 Suppose Tara Tenant, who is on a fixed income, leases a unit for one year at
$1000 per month. She could expect her rent to go up by about $10 a month or $120 a year
for every one percent increase in area rents. Suppose she obtains a one-year call option
that is indexed to rental values within her ZIP code, at a value that corresponds to her
lease’s rental amount. If, in a year, prices have shot up 20%, her option would be worth
$2400 ($120 X 20).95 Assuming her unit tracks the area trend, the payment she receives
92

This point is analogous to the “front-end load[ing]” associated with forms of rent control that apply
only within, and not between, tenancies. See Arnott, supra note 83, at 94.
93
Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13; see Robert I. Lerman, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement
While Protected Low-Income Families, prepared for presentation at the 29th Research Conference
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Nov. 8, 2009 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) (expanding on the ideas in Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, and including options
pricing estimates). The idea of such a financial instrument is also raised in O’FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at
369.
94
In the interest of providing an intuitive illustration of how tenant options could work, this example
ignores some important refinements that will be discussed below; accordingly, it should not be viewed as
an operational template. More generally, because Lerman and McKernan have provided relatively few
details about their proposal, the descriptions in this section may diverge in some respects from the options
regime they envision.
95
Although this example suggests that tenants would receive complete protection against area rent
increases, options would likely be structured to provide somewhat less protection. For example, the tenant’s
option might begin to gain value only after increases in area rents have outpaced inflation by a small
amount. In options terminology, the “strike price” would be adjusted upward, constricting the
circumstances in which the option is “in the money” (valuable to exercise), and thereby reducing the price
of the option itself. See Lerman, supra note 93, at 10-12. Similarly, rent control systems generally permit
annual percentage adjustments of some sort. See DOWNS, supra note 84, at 34.
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under the option would cover the cost of any rental increases associated with renewing
the lease for another year at her present location. Alternatively, Tara might take the cash
and rent (or buy) elsewhere, having benefited from the general improvement in her
community.96 If, instead, area rental prices stayed the same or fell, the option would not
pay anything.97
In effect, such a call option would insure tenants against area rent increases.98 A
tenant holding such an instrument would have a stake in the community’s improvement
that she currently lacks.99 By lengthening the tenant’s time horizon and protecting against
displacement, the program would be expected to foster the development of social capital
and reduce opposition to community changes that are likely to have positive effects on
property values.100
Many additional design details would have to be worked through, however. Chief
among them is the issue of who would pay for the option. Tenants, especially those most
at risk of displacement through gentrification, are unlikely to have the ability to, let alone
much interest in, spending money on complex financial investments. Local governments,
who have much to gain from tenant stability (and who may have to spend money on some
form of affordable housing) might purchase such instruments to give to low-income
96

See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, at 2. For example, her landlord may not keep up the unit in a
fashion that reflects the overall improvement in the area. If the landlord nonetheless raises the rent to a
level consonant with overall price trends, Tara may decide to use the money to move to a nicer unit. If her
landlord opts for a smaller (or no) rental increase, Tara might stay and spend the cash on non-rental needs.
97
Conceivably, a tenant could sell an instrument exposing her to the risk of downward fluctuations in
area rental values. She could collect a premium for selling a “put” requiring her to pay out an amount
corresponding to the decline in area rents. For example, suppose the area’s property values went down in
value by 10 percent, reducing the rent demand by Tara’s landlord from $1000 per month to $900 per
month. Tara would have to pay the holder of the put $100 per month, or $1200 per year, leaving her in the
same position (from a cash perspective) as if her rent had stayed at $1000. Builders or landlords with an
interest in buffering the risk of falling rents might wish to hedge against that eventuality, and, in theory,
tenants could take the other side of those transactions. See Lerman, supra note 93, at 5, 8. Although the sale
of the put would allow tenants like Tara to partially offset the cost of obtaining protection against upward
rent movements, we assume such arrangements would be too risky to interest many tenants. Tenants would
find it hard to make the necessary payments if falling area rents correlated with labor market declines or if
their particular units failed to experience a rent decrease.
98
A tenant protection policy might be explicitly structured as an insurance policy against rent increases
rather than as a tradable option. See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, at 2; Lerman, supra note 93, at 78.
99
See Lerman, supra note 93, at 12.
100
See id. We do not mean to suggest that a tenant stakeholder program will—or should—make all
tenants support every change with a positive expected impact on property values. Both tenants and
homeowners might rationally oppose changes that would increase property values but alter the character of
the neighborhood in ways that would reduce their desire to remain. Homeowners seek to maximize the sum
of their consumption flow and their investment returns, and may rationally forgo some of the latter in favor
of more of the former, especially if they plan to stay for a long time. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 3, at
150. Tenants given the equivalent of an investment stake would be expected to make similar tradeoffs. As
Lance Freeman makes clear in his book, THERE GOES THE ‘HOOD, although gentrification often brings
desired amenities to an area, such as increased retail and improvements in city services, it also often brings
conflict regarding the use of public space, FREEMAN, supra note 35. at 137, and can evoke “feelings of
anger and racially based disrespect,” see id. at 111.
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tenants living within their jurisdictions, while making the options available to other
tenants at market rates or on a sliding-scale basis.101 To the extent funding comes from
general property tax revenues, such a program would partially redistribute gentrification
gains from landowners to tenants.102 Unlike rent control, the costs of this redistribution
would be borne by the entire class of landowners, rather than the smaller subset of rentcontrolled landlords. The possibility that the costs would be shifted back onto tenants
would diminish accordingly.
Once local government funding enters the picture, however, additional complications
arise. For example, subsidized options would have to be pegged to median rents in the
area, adjusted for family size, rather than to a household’s actual rental costs to prevent
distortion in housing choices; tenants choosing relatively more expensive
accommodations could then purchase additional protection at market rates if they
desired.103 Subsidized programs could also encounter state law impediments. In addition
to generalized attacks on such programs on “public purpose” grounds,104 some
jurisdictions may lack the authority to provide tenants with rent subsidies taking the form
of financial instruments offering cash-out options. A broader normative concern that
would be exacerbated by the subsidy feature is that tenant households could cash out their
option gains only to later suffer displacement or even homelessness. To avoid these
problems, communities might have to place limits on how payouts from subsidized
options could be used.105
Two additional design decisions—the degree of mobility that these tenant options
should facilitate, and the timing and structure of option payouts—raise a bevy of issues.
Although one advantage of the call option structure is that it grants tenants the ability to

101

One possibility would be for the local government to provide the hedge itself (rather than merely act
as a conduit for passing risk to investors). See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, at 3 (explaining that
the local government would only make payouts in when property values have risen; the rise in property
values could increase property tax receipts by enough to fund the required payouts). A locality taking this
approach could achieve the same economic result by executing a contractual rent subsidy agreement with
selected tenants making payouts contingent on changes in local rental values. Use of the option format,
however, may make it easier for localities to price and to fund the protection being provided given the
existence of an outside market for such instruments.
102
Alternatively, one might characterize the program as compensating tenants for the harm of
gentrification. See Barbara Bezdek, Putting Community Equity In Community Development: Resident
Equity Participation in Urban Redevelopment, U. Md. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-3 available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1322277, at 10-14 (enumerating harms inflicted by gentrification).
103
Lerman and McKernan may have this issue in mind when they note that under their proposal, “[t]he
benefit paid would not depend on the price of the renter’s own unit, as this could create incentives for abuse
by renters and landlords.” See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, at 2.
104
Most states have constitutional, if not legislative, prohibitions against spending governmental money
for anything other than “public purposes.” Historically, subsidized housing programs have been attacked as
diversions of public money for the “private” gain of the subsidized tenants. Although most courts now
accept that subsidized housing confers a public benefit, the new forms of subsidies discussed in this
article—particularly the multi-year cash out option—may reinvigorate this issue.
105
See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, at 3 (suggesting that “[s]ome limitations might be placed on
those assets purchased with government subsidies”).
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move to other accommodations,106 unlimited tenant mobility may decrease the social
value of the program by reducing continuity. At least in some jurisdictions, the point of
offering a housing subsidy (whether in the form of an option or otherwise) is to maintain
an economically diverse community. If the option follows the tenant rather than the rental
unit, such diversity will be lost whenever the tenant prefers cash and residence in a
cheaper jurisdiction to continued residence in the community.107 Other jurisdictions,
however, may be seeking another type of diversity, such as the introduction of wealthier
members to the community108 or the creation (or preservation) of job opportunities, both
of which may require the displacement of some members of the existing community.109
Options that enable tenants to move as community conditions change could diminish the
need for more invasive displacement actions, notably the exercise of eminent domain.110
A related question is how the cash-out option ought to be structured. If the option
covers only a year’s worth of rental increases at a time, with subsequent pay-outs linked
to continued residence in a jurisdiction, tenants may be loathe to move, reducing the
difference between the call option mechanism and a place-based rental subsidy. On the
other hand, if tenants are granted a spatially unrestricted call option offering a stream of
payments over a multi-year period, which could be sold for a lump sum equivalent to
several years’ worth of payments,111 a series of tenants could cash in (and move out) in

106

Absent this ability, landlords might treat their tenants as a captive audience, skimping on maintenance
and other services, essentially overcharging those tenants (and the subsidizing government) for the
accommodations provided.
107
Though sympathetic scholars such as Bezdek, supra note 102, at 8, assume that tenants would want to
stay in gentrifying areas if only they could afford to, and recent studies suggest that most in fact stay, see
Freeman & Braconi, supra note 34, at 48, some might prefer to move. Even long-time residents may feel
out of place as their neighborhood changes around them. Their friends may die or leave, new stores
catering to a different clientele may replace the establishments they used to patronize, and community
organizations may develop a different focus. See FREEMAN, supra note 35, at 83 (citing literature decrying
changes brought by gentrification “loathed by long-term residents”).
108
For discussion of the potential advantages of income mixing, see, for example, Alex F. Schwartz,
HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 263 (2006); Henry J. Wexler, Goals,
Strategies and Midterm Lessons of HUD’s Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. 195, 204-206 (2001); Alastair Smith, Mixed Income Housing Developments: Promise
and Reality, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University 1 (2002), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/W02-10_Smith.pdf. But see FREEMAN, supra note 35, at 204
(“there seems to be little reason to expect gentrification to significantly alter the class trajectories of
residents indigenous to gentrifying neighborhoods—at least in the short run”).
109
Perhaps the most famous example of resident displacement in the name of job preservation was
Detroit’s use of eminent domain to displace the residents of Poletown in order to facilitate the construction
of an automobile assembly plant. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 301 N.W. 2d 455,
410 Mich. 616 (1981) overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
110
We do not mean to suggest that tenant options would always make eminent domain unnecessary, nor
that voluntary moves prompted by community changes are necessarily free from negative normative
implications. Nonetheless, eminent domain is often thought to constitute a particularly damaging form of
displacement.
111
See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing plans guaranteeing tenants 10 years of
expected future benefits, regardless of whether they move).
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sequence, causing the costs of the program to balloon.112 A third alternative would be to
provide multi-year options to only those tenants who happen to live in a jurisdiction at
the time such a program is enacted.113 This may be appropriate, or at least no worse from
a social justice standpoint, than the one-time bonus (in the form of price appreciation)
enjoyed by area landowners at the time such appreciation occurs. But if gentrification is a
lengthy and unpredictable process, the program’s failure to cover incoming tenants could
prove problematic. While new tenants would initially lack the sorts of social or economic
networks that would be disrupted by gentrification (or the need to move) and might come
in at rent levels that at least partially accounted for anticipated property value increases,
their incentives to invest in the community could be clouded by their uncertainty about
future rent increases.
The answer may be that different communities should adopt different programs.
Those interested in maintaining diversity should enact programs tied to, if not particular
rental units, a specified number of units located within the community. This might be
accomplished by providing payouts in the form of rental vouchers valid only within the
community. Communities seeking to compensate likely-to-be displaced residents might
opt for programs providing longer-term, cash basis options or rental insurance policies
available to a specific group of current residents. Although designing workable programs
will be challenging, we think there is considerable room for experimentation with this
suite of alternatives.
Putting these ideas together with the one in the previous section would give local
governments an interesting and powerful new role in managing resident stakeholding.
Local governments could educate, facilitate, subsidize, and coordinate programs that shift
local housing market risk away from homeowners and (as to the upside potential) toward
tenants. Differences in the time horizons of the two groups—homeowners need to wait
until sale to settle their options, while tenants will need payouts timed to cover annual
rental increases—prevent them from directly trading risk with each other. But local
governments would be well-positioned to broker trades with investors who can take the
other side of both kinds of transactions.

112

For example, if the call option generates cash representing the value of 10 years of rental increases,
one tenant may move out at the end of year 1, entitled to receive a further 9 years of payments, while
another tenant moves in at the start of year 2, moving out at the end of the year and becoming entitled to a
further 9 years of payment, a third may take up residence in year 3 and move out in year 4, and so on.
Ultimately, multiple tenants may become entitled to payments for each year’s increase in rental costs with
respect to that single apartment. And, of course, former tenants may be entitled to collect similar payments
under similar plans offered with respect to their new places of residence.
113
This dilemma—the conflict between subsidizing existing tenants and preserving assets for future
tenants—is similar to the choice faced by designers of shared equity programs for low-income
homeownership. See Rick Jacobus and Jeffrey Lubell, Preservation of Affordable Homeownership: A
Continuum of Strategies, Center for Housing Policy, Policy Brief 19 (2007), available at
http://www.ncbcapitalimpact.org/uploadedFiles/downloads/JacobusLubelloption4-07.pdf.
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IV. REGIONAL STAKES
The devices described above are aimed at changing stakeholding arrangements within
a given jurisdiction. But a central dilemma of local governance, exacerbated by the
phenomenon of overstaked homeowners, is that of interlocal spillovers. Exclusionary
zoning presents one example of an oft-noted problem created by territorial boundaries
within metropolitan areas: the ability of some jurisdictions to reap the general
agglomeration benefits of the metropolitan area without fully sharing in the costs of that
agglomeration, and indeed, by failing to share, increasing overall costs.114 Even if
deconcentrating poverty would produce large net gains throughout the region, few
communities are sufficiently altruistic to attract households likely to be a net financial
burden.
One impetus for altering stakes, then, is to foster a style of local governance that
responds more cooperatively and efficiently to problems that are regional in nature.
While permitting homeowners to reduce their exposure to housing market fluctuations in
the manner suggested above should help to curb NIMBY tendencies, metropolitan areas
might want or need to do more to align the interests of residents of different jurisdictions.
A. Regionalization, Extraterritoriality, and Bargaining
Some existing doctrines, such as the requirement that annexed areas be “contiguous,”
help to address some of the most egregious efforts to offload costs on other
jurisdictions.115 Revenue sharing can also spread costs and benefits interlocally, although
it often generates significant political backlash.116 Legal restraints and post hoc
114

See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1115 (1996).
115
For discussion of the contiguity requirement, see, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and
Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 670-86 (1994). While the
contiguity requirement can prevent cities from annexing far-flung wealthy communities while ignoring
intermediate poor ones, it cannot prevent communities from refraining from all annexation in order to avoid
the annexation of poor areas. Remedying that situation requires changes in state annexation rules. Scholars
advocating such changes have come up with different suggestions based on differing assumptions about the
location of needy individuals. Compare Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty and
Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1159 (2008) (advocating “state legal reforms that
increase territorial outsiders’ ability to initiate annexation”) with Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal
Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247, 253-254 (1992) (advocating allowing municipalities greater power
to annex “nonresidents on the fringe”).
116
There is an ongoing scholarly debate over whether the California Supreme Court’s decision in Serrano
v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rep. 601 (1971), striking down California’s reliance on local property taxes for financing
public schools, was responsible for the later success of Proposition 13. The leading proponent for causality,
Professor William Fischel, argued that by de-linking local taxes from local service provision, Serrano
turned local taxes into a “deadweight loss” for most voters, making them more likely to vote for
Proposition 13. See William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 465, 469
(1988). Others attribute Proposition 13’s enactment to other causes. See Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff,
Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801, 853-854
(2003) (“Our analysis has shown, we believe, that there is little empirical foundation for Fischel’s claim
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redistribution can only go so far. What is needed is a mechanism for affirmatively
knitting together the interests of different jurisdictions within a metropolitan area.
One response that has attracted some scholarly adherents involves changing the size
of the decisionmaking unit through regionalization.117 The disadvantage of this approach
is that it undercuts local control that might be scaled appropriately for a variety of other
problems, and diminishes the potential for useful interlocal variation and competition
along the lines suggested by the Tiebout Hypothesis.118 At the other end of the spectrum,
metropolitan areas might simply rely on interlocal bargaining, buttressed by repeat play
among neighboring jurisdictions.119 Yet interlocal bargains often fail to emerge,
generating conflicts among jurisdictions.120 In between these extremes lie a variety of
possible approaches, including multi-tiered governmental structures,121 cross-border
voting,122 and interlocal liability rules designed to sidestep bargaining impediments.123
We cannot do justice to these proposals here, but it is worth noting that each would
that Serrano caused Proposition 13.”) Professor Fischel stands by his original position. See William A.
Fischel, Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s ‘Tiebout and Tax
Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?’, 33 STATE TAX NOTES 381 (2004). Other state plans
that have reallocated local property tax revenues to equalize school funding have encountered serious
political resistance. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local
Control in School Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835,1885 (2007) (Texas and Vermont
experiences “leave no doubt about the political volatility of this school funding system”); Maurice Dyson,
The Death of Robin Hood? Proposals for Overhauling Public School Finance, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 1 (2004) (Texas).
117
See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY
(1997); Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 11, 14-15 (1997); Richard Briffault, supra note 114, at 1165. Some examples of regional governance
exist. See LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
725-731 (3d ed. 2004) (describing existing regional governments and discussing the issues that gave rise to
them). However, most believe the political support necessary for the establishment of comprehensive forms
of metropolitan government is absent. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN
AMERICA 170 (1994); Richard Briffault, supra note 114, at 1171; Anmon Lehavi, Intergovernmental
Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 981 (2006).
118
See Richard Briffault, supra note 114, at 124; Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 Buff.
L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (2000) (stating arguments of “advocates of decentralization”); Clayton P. Gillette, The
Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J. LAW & POL. 365, 365 (2005); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism,, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 47 (1997).
119
Fischel suggests that municipalities have disincentives to engage in “beggar thy neighbor” tactics,
arguing that neighboring jurisdictions “are locked into a web of mutually beneficial exchanges at both the
political and the personal levels.” FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 184. But see, e.g., Lehavi, supra note 117, at
942-46 (discussing Fischel’s account and suggesting he “may have been overly optimistic”); Briffault,
supra note 114, at 1149 (describing how local decisions can create “a tragedy of the regional ‘commons’”).
120
See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 114, at 1144-51;. Gillette, supra note 118, at 373-382 (describing
“contracting cost” barriers to inter-local cooperation); Lehavi, supra note 117, at 943-944 (“Empirical
evidence further indicates that local governments usually deal with each other on a more short-term,
subject-specific accountancy basis than the order without law approach would suggest.”).
121
See Briffault, supra note 114, at 1165-1166.
122
See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 329 (1993); Ford, supra note 6,
at 1909; see also Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URBAN LAWYER 93, 120-37
(2009) (proposing a redistricting scheme for local governance that would employ periodically shifting
boundaries).
123
See Lehavi, supra note 117, at 988.
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require either a significant political restructuring, a difficult set of normative
determinations about the magnitude and direction of spillovers, or both. The conflicting
interests that motivate these proposals would also likely impede the formulation of the
solutions themselves.
B. Synthetic Stake-Sharing
It is possible that some of the instruments and strategies described in Parts II and III
for off-loading and reallocating risks within a community could be reconfigured to
accomplish analogous risk reallocations between communities, and in the process, reduce
political resistance to measures and mechanisms designed to promote regional objectives
like socioeconomic integration. The idea would be to explicitly link the financial and
social fortunes of politically distinct entities within a metropolitan area—in a sense, to
replicate the strategy-proofing advantages that Henry Smith has attributed to the
medieval common field arrangement.124
The medieval common field arrangement interspersed privately owned strips of
farmland throughout a larger grazing commons, creating what Smith has termed a
“semicommons.”125 Each individual farmer owned a number of scattered strips rather
than owning one consolidated field.126 This physical interspersing of land made it harder
for participants to selectively burden others; actions which degraded one area of the field
were likely to affect everyone and not just a disfavored few.127 Although the idea of
discontinuously interspersed local jurisdictions (or even jurisdictions that are contiguous
but intricately interlocked) seems both fanciful and deeply problematic, a virtual (or
synthetic) interspersing could be accomplished through community-indexed investments
reciprocally held by residents of different localities.
While space does not permit a detailed exploration of this idea here, the basic
building blocks would be the area-indexed investment instruments discussed above,
which allow homeowners to shed the risk associated with local housing markets and
tenants to share in the gains of the community. The earlier discussion suggested that
(aside from tenants), most of those accepting risk from homeowners would be investors
with well-diversified portfolios and no particular ties to the community. But housing risk
could be shifted around much more selectively, so that residents (either directly or
through their local government institutions) take home equity stakes in jurisdictions
neighboring their own. While this approach would do little to relieve the problem of poor
diversification that has been associated with homeownership (a region’s housing markets
are likely to be at least somewhat correlated) it would help to address the misalignment of
124

See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131 (2000).
125
See id.
126
See id.; Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1388-90 & fig. 3 (describing
and depicting this arrangement).
127
See Smith, supra note 124.
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incentives that causes local governments to impose negative externalities on other parts
of the larger metropolitan system.
To illustrate how the concept might be applied (without endorsing this particular
approach), suppose a state legislature passes a Stakeholding Enabling Act granting local
governments the power to buy and sell securities indexed to local property values and to
subsidize the provision of options to tenants, on condition that the local government
agrees to participate in a regional risk-sharing arrangement. This regional arrangement
would be conducted in accordance with state-prescribed standards, would require a stateprescribed minimum level of investment, and would require each local jurisdiction to
adopt a residential stakeholding plan that meets certain state standards. Each jurisdiction
could then set up residential stakeholding programs offering homeowners the ability to
shed local market risk and tenants the ability to accept local (upside) market risk.
Pursuant to the regional arrangement, the jurisdictions would be required to buy a certain
number of locally-indexed options from each other, pursuant to the regional risk-sharing
requirements, and to either hold onto them for a given period or to sell them to residents
within their own communities. In addition, or alternatively, each locality could set up tax
preference schemes or other incentives to encourage those local homeowners who wish to
bear housing market risk to trade in some of the appreciation rights associated with their
own local area for an option indexed to a compilation of surrounding jurisdictions.
The resulting cross investment would mean that jurisdictions’ investment losses
would (at least partially) offset any gains from adopting “beggar thy neighbor” policies
that produce negative externalities. This rewiring of the economic interests of residents
should induce localities to act more cooperatively.
CONCLUSION
The problem of suboptimal residential stakeholding is nothing new, but the present
financial crisis has thrown it into bold relief. In this essay, we have tried to suggest that
this crisis offers an opportunity to rethink in a more comprehensive manner the way in
which residential risk is held and shared. While our discussion here has been brief and
tentative, we hope that it will help to spark interest in residential stake management as a
important policy instrument for state and local governments. We think it is one that might
be creatively wielded in ways that would not only respond to current realities, but also
help to address longstanding conflicts of interest between homeowners and tenants, and
between residents of different localities in the same metropolitan area.

17-Aug-09]

CONTROLLING RESIDENTIAL STAKES

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Lee A. Fennell
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
lfennell@uchicago.edu

27

28

Fennell & Roin

[17-Aug-09

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–399 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

Shyam Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives (April 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (April 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime (April 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments (April 2008)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study (April
2008)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High
Courts? (May 2008)
Richard H. McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (May 2008, revised October
2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm (Mary 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication (June 2008)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination? (June 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and Karl A. Muller, III, Scienter Disclosure (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, Taxes and the Success of Non-Tax Market-Based Environmental Regulatory
Regimes (July 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law (June 2008)
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud (June 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap-Filling (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, How to Repair Unconscionable Contracts (July 2008)
Richard A. Epstein and David A. Hyman, Controlling the Costs of Medical Care: A Dose of
Deregulation (July 2008)
Eric A. Posner, Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, and Constitutionalism in International
Law (August 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Eric A. Posner, Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why? (August 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming (August 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold (August 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property (August 2008)
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment
(August 2008)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights
Jurisprudence (August 2008)
Daniel Abebe and Jonathan S. Masur, A Nation Divided: Eastern China, Western China, and the
Problems of Global Warming (August 2008)
William Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in
Private Equity (August 2008)
Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks (abstract only) (September 2008)
Paul J. Heald, Testing the Over- and Under-Exploitation Hypothesis: Bestselling Musical
Compositions (1913–32) and Their Use in Cinema (1968–2007) (September 2008)

17-Aug-09]

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

CONTROLLING RESIDENTIAL STAKES

29

M. Todd Henderson and Richard A. Epstein, Introduction to “The Going Private Phenomenon:
Causes and Implications” (September 2008)
Paul Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model (September 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism (September 2008)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: The Birth of Natural Order, the Illusion of Free Markets
(September 2008)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Abolition in the U.S.A. by 2050: On Political Capital and Ordinary Acts of
Resistance (September 2008)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability for Lapses: First or Second Order Negligence? (October
2008)
Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault in Defense Contract Law (October 2008)
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory and the Law
(October 2008)
Dhammika Dharamapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Belief in a Just World,
Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Satatutes (October 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, The Impotence of Delaware’s Taxes: A Short Response to Professor
Barzuza’s Delaware’s Compensation (October 2008)
Richard McAdams and Thomas Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics (November 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation (November
2008)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008 (November 2008)
Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability (November 2008)
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardinas: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence (November 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to Do Economics Right,
without Really Trying (December 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Zeckhauser, Overreaction to Fearsome Risks (December 2008)
Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (January 2009)
David A. Weisbach, Responsibility for Climate Change, by the Numbers (January 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law (January 2009)
Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach (January 2009)
Tom Ginsburg, Public Choice and Constitutional Design (January 2009)
Richard Epstein, The Case against the Employee Free Choice Act (January 2009)
Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles (February 2009)
Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and
Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective (February 2009)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon (February 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation and the Market for Paternalism (February 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (February 2009)
Richard A. Epstein and M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market: Can Accounting Rules Shake the
Foundations of Capitalism? (April 2009)
Eric A. Posner and Luigi Zingales, The Housing Crisis and Bankruptcy Reform: The Prepackaged
Chapter 13 Approach (April 2009)
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response
to the Judicial Salary Debate (April 2009)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants (April 2009)
Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly? (April
2009, revised July 2009)

30

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

Fennell & Roin

[17-Aug-09

Randal C. Picker, The Mediated Book (May 2009)
Anupam Chander, Corporate Law’s Distributive Design (June 2009)
Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0 (June 2009)
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes,a nd Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in the
Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument (June 2009)
Eric A Posner, Kathryn Spier, and Adrian Vermeule, Divide and Conquer (June 2009)
John Bronsteen, Christopher J. Buccafucso, and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness (June
2009)
Richard A. Epstein and Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Soveriegn Wealth Funds: The
Virtues of Going Slow (June 2009)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy (June 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Alon Harel, Ken Levy, Michael M. O’Hear, and Alice Ristroph,
Randomization in Criminal Justice: A Criminal Law Conversation (June 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy (June 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy (June 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, How to Undermine Tax Increment Financing: The Lessons of ProLogis v.
City of Chicago (June 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Online Advertising, Identity and Privacy (June 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance” (July 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell and Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes (July 2009)

